Operations Moshtrarak -in which U.S., British and Afghan forces are working "together" to eliminate the Taliban from the Helmand Province dominates the front page of today's (February 13, 2010) New York Times. Coupled with the military initiative are plans to install and support Afghan civil authority. By establishing a secure environment, with schools and healthcare facilities, opportunities to deprive the Taliban of financial support from Helmand poppy crops can emerge. This offensive in Marja is a turning point in the confrontation with the Taliban. I commented on the logic of focusing on the Helmand Province in Post #1 of this Blog. Only twenty-five percent of those who have visited this site have read Post #1. Now that a Helmand strategy has become evident, I would like to point out that there are some aspects of the Helmand situation, which have not yet entered mainstream reporting, that are included in Post #1. Note that Post #1 becomes more readable if one clicks on the Fullscreen option.

In its Editorial on December 26th entitled, "President Karzai's Inauspicious Start," the New York Times castigates the inclusion of three warlords among the cabinet appointments: Ismail Khan, Qasim Fahim and Karim Khalili. Another potential appointment was Gul Agha Sherzai. The Times and other Western Media consistently view warlords as anathema to proper administration of civil society. Yet, beyond assertions that they have misused power, there is little discussion of who these individuals are or possible reasons for their appointment by Karzai. The term Warlord was widely used to describe powerful figures who assumed leadership roles in China during the first half of the Twentieth Century. Warlords are typically considered to exercise both military and civil control over large areas of a country through the allegiance of armed forces that are loyal to the warlord rather than to a central national authority. These four Afghans, at some point in recent history, all met those criteria. However, the designation may not apply today.

What is more significant in the records of these Afghan leaders is that they all played key roles in overthrowing Taliban rule when the United States invaded in 2001. Their participation in that war of liberation accelerated the war's success and minimized loss of American lives. All four were key partners with the U.S. military. They received substantial U.S. support and became secure in their positions of power through liaison with the United States.

* Fahim was deputy to Ahmad Shah Massoud, the charismatic leader of the Northern Alliance who was assassinated by Al Queda on September 9, 2001. Fahim replaced Massoud as Minister of Defense of the Northern Alliance and marched to liberate Kabul in November 2001 in a joint effort with U.S. coalition forces. In December 2003, most of his personal militia turned their weapons over to the Afghan National Army.

* Gul Agha Sherzai led the capture of Kandahar in late 2001, with assistance from American special forces and air strikes. He maintained his military forces, but was replaced as Governor of Kandahar by President Karzai in August 2003. He was moved away from his personal power base in Kandahar and has most recently been serving in Jalalabad as Governor of Nangahar Province. Gul Agha does not have a strong religious background. He was born to the family of poor restaurant owners in Kandahar and served, like his father, as a bureaucrat in local government in Kandahar.

* Ismail Khan led one of two Northern Alliance military initiatives that drove the Taliban from Herat in November of 2001. Khan had been Governor of Herat following the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan and re-assumed that position upon the expulsion of the Taliban. The United States and the Karzai government did not approve of Khan's ties to Iran and his autocratic approach. The Karzai government ousted Khan after a military clash with forces of the Afghan National Army. Karzai brought Khan into his cabinet as Minister of Energy in September 2004.

* Karim Khalili led the Shia Hazara population of Afghanistan in their opposition to the Taliban from 1996. In November 2001, Khalili led his troops in capturing the city of Bamiyan in Central Afghanistan. In 2002 he left his military and civil roles in Central Afghanistan to become a Deputy President under Karzai.

These four "Warlords" were prominent liberators of Afghanistan from Taliban rule. Rather than using the pejorative term, "Warlord," they could have been designated "Heros of the Liberation." They were leaders in eliminating Taliban rule from Kabul in the East, Kandahar in the South, Herat in the West and Bamiyan in the Central Highlands. Karzai should be given credit for extracting each of the four from positions as regional civil and military rulers to become participants in the central government. By having these four working with him, they associate their considerable political influence with the identity and needs of the central government. Success in eliminating civil/military rulers, particularly in Kandahar and Herat, and drawing them into the activities and plans of the central government, belies the off-quoted characterization of Karzai as the Mayor of Kabul.

We should also note that in countries around the world, wherever there have been struggles for independence or the elimination of an oppressive regime, those who led the armed combat have generally been given positions of importance in the new leadership. Recently, Jacob Zuma, who was a long time leader of the ANC, has risen to the Presidency of South Africa despite scandals and accusations of wrongdoing. His leadership role in the movement to end apartheid trumped all concerns about his less than pristine background.

While Karzai has been able to engage some important regional leaders in the workings of the central government, he has not necessarily been able to transform them into poster boys for clean government. Nevertheless. the inclusion of these regional leaders in the operations of the central government is far more desirable than having them controlling semi-autonomous regions of the country.

By far, the greatest obstacle to open democratic government in Afghanistan from the era of freewheeling Warlords is Abdul Rashid Dostum. Dostum is an Uzbek from the northern city of Shiberghan. Dostum has been a fierce military leader and a savvy, cruel ruler of regions of Northern Afghanistan. Karzi has been unable to loosen Dostum's hold on power. In August of 2009, Karzi did just the opposite by welcoming Dostum back from exile in Turkey and reinstating his honorary, but symbolic, title of Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief. He did this to obtain Dostum's cooperation in securing votes in the presidential election from Uzbeks, who constitute 9% of the national population. Dostum is an avaricious, power hungry opportunist. He started working with the Soviet Military in 1978 and continued to support the Afghan Communist regime of Najibullah after the Red Army withdrew from Afghanistan. In 1992 he switched sides to fight with the Mujahideen to topple Najibullah and his associates. Dostum went back and forth between Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Ahmad Shah Massoud during the civil war period which followed the Communist government's collapse. After other cases of double-dealing and an exile in Turkey, he returned to Afghanistan in 2001 to join Fahim and Ismail Khan as leaders of the Northern Alliance in efforts to expel the Taliban. There are serious allegations of Dostum being responsible for the massacre of 2000 Taliban prisoners. Dostum served as deputy defense minister for Karzai, but simultaneously maintained strong control in the North. In February 2008, Dostum attacked a rival and orchestrated a kidnapping in Kabul which was considered a criminal offense. Rather than try to prosecute him, Karzai allowed Dostum's departure for Turkey in December of 2008. where he remained until his return in August of 2009.

While Dostum remains a rogue leader in Afghanistan, he is staunchly opposed to jihadism and is not likely to support the objectives of the Taliban or Al Qaeda.

This brief review shows that that five leading Warlords of Afghanistan could all claim to be Heros of the Liberation. They are all power brokers with influence in different geographic regions of the country. Two are Tajiks (Fahim and Ismail Khan), one is a Pashtun (Gul Agha), one an Uzbek (Dostum) and one an Hazara (Kalili). Given that almost all Taliban are Pashtuns, but not all Pashtuns are Taliban, it serves Karzai's interests to have strong leaders on his side who are not Pashtun - along with a Pashtun leader who is anti-Taliban.

Rather than accept the term "Warlord" as a shorthand for a collection of negative attributes, it would be better to consider those who are so designated as complex individuals. And rather than castigating Karzi for caving in to the demands of nefarious "Warlords," one might usefully consider the political pro's and con's of his dealings with regional "Heros of the Liberation."

As of January 2, 2010, the Afghan Parliament rejected the nomination of Ismail Khan and others for Cabinet positions. As outsiders view ongoing political events in Afghanistan, it would be useful if we all tried to learn more about the historical background of the events and take a more nuanced view of developments.

In Post #4 I shared my letter to the Editor of the New York Times regarding the Helmand Province strategy. There is little coverage of this strategy in the press with the exception of the Christian Science Monitor. On December 23, 2009 an extended article by Ben Arnoldy in the Christian Science Monitor reports on events there. While difficult, progress is being made. The added troops are working to reduce the flow of Taliban from Pakistan into the Helmand - Kandahar region. They are also securing villages in Helmand and training Afghan police. These efforts are likely to be increasingly successful as more U.S. troops become available. The advantages of this strategy will have a cumulative impact - reducing Taliban influence in their core Pashtun homeland, taking control of regions in which the vast number of poppies are grown, establishing positive relationships with local populations and, in general, demonstrating the capacity for U.S. success in
Afghanistan. This strategic initiative needs to be coupled with efforts to eliminate Taliban bases and administrative centers in Pakistan. Those efforts have yet to emerge, but are essential. Remember, that while the Taliban are almost exclusively Pashtun and while Helmand is the largest Pashtun province in Afghanistan, it is also the historic center for successful American assistance to Afghanistan from the 50's, 60's and 70's.

See the article by Ben Arnoldy at:

http://www.csmonitor.com/World/2009/1223/Afghanistan-war-Marines-move-in-to-s...

Thanks to Barnett Rubin's Afghanistan List through Yahoo Groups, I received a copy, today, of National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment 2007/8 for Afghanistan prepared by the National Surveillance System of the European Commission.

A section of this report deals with Literacy.

This report reveals that in urban areas the male literacy rate is 62% and the female rate is 33%

The rural rates are 35% for male and 7% for female.

There are a number of quite positive results regarding the impact of the improved education system since the fall of the Taliban. For young people aged between 15 and 24, the overall rate is 39%, with that for males being 53% and for females 24%.

An analysis of the available statistics shows that the increasing numbers of children in school are made up equally of boys and girls.

While Afghanistan still has low levels of literacy based upon international comparisons, it is clear that the expansion of education since the fall of the Taliban has had a big impact on young people and has been of dramatic importance for females.

Hence we see that there will be a steady increase in literacy for new recruits for Police and Military training. The literacy rate of 28% for new recruits that has been used by critics of the program is too low and changing for the better with time.

Given the clear success of this aspect of basic education in Afghanistan since 2002, there is a good case for expanding the literacy component of those programs and introducing robust functional literacy programs for adults.

U. S. policy in Afghanistan has been debated for more than fifty years. The White House review by President Obama is the most recent, but not unlike some discussions from the past. Most telling are premises that are omitted or erroneous.

Missing from Barak Obama's speech on December 1st, were plans for strengthening civil society beyond agricultural development. The need to engage the Afghan people in the common pursuit of improved healthcare or education was not mentioned. These are fundamental needs. Dealing with them can engender enthusiasm among Afghans for American efforts in their country. Neglecting them will alienate the Afghans. Why were they omitted? Perhaps they are on the U.S. agenda, but the administration is leery of focusing on what might be considered "nation building" or "classical counterinsurgency," since we deny that these are among our objectives. These activities have become politically unacceptable.

But is it possible to implement a strategy aimed at establishing large indigenous police and military forces, without enhancing the nation's human resources? I think not.

Reactions to the President's speech on December 1st have been diverse, but one common element in the commentaries are pejorative references to the low literacy rate of the Afghans. Only 28 percent of Afghans are considered literate.

The failure to couple the reality of low literacy rates in Afghanistan to the need to train hundreds of thousands of Afghans to perform complex tasks is unfortunate. The U.S. should integrate functional literacy training into the programs designed for police and soldiers. Such programs should also be introduced into the general society. Their cost would be small, while their impact would be high.

While it may be that the Department of Defense plans to engage in some functional literacy development for the soldiers and the police, there is no reason to expect that such programs will be implemented to strengthen civil society.

Certainly no comprehensive approach to human resource development has been enunciated by the Obama Administration. As in the example of literacy, human skills are closely linked to policy objectives. Given the huge military presence that the U.S. will have in Afghanistan, many people will be needed to provide technical support for construction, for support of expanded telecommunications infrastructure and many other necessities. Rather
than rely exclusively on outside contractors, why aren't Afghans being trained to take on these responsibilities? Not only would costs be reduced, but the Afghan economy would receive a much needed stimulus.

I suspect that there is a colonial mentality at work which thinks of the Afghans as being incapable of assuming high level skills. It is also possible that the capacity of Afghans is recognized, but the effort is thought to be too difficult and expensive.

From 1970 to 1973, I was the director of a U.S. program to develop an indigenous college of engineering in Afghanistan. I engaged in many arguments with the U.S. Ambassador at that time, Robert G. Neumann (whose son Ronald E. Neumann served
as U.S. Ambassador in Kabul in 2006), regarding the standards at the engineering school. I and the U.S. universities contributing to the development project, held the position that the engineering school should adhere to international standards. Ambassador Neurmann held the official view of USAID that lesser standards should be applied in a country that was at a low level of development. I argued that a country could never develop if that were the approach taken by its benefactors. I also pointed out to Ambassador Neumann that he would not want to drive his car over a bridge that had been designed by an engineer who did not perform at high standards. The university consortium's opinion prevailed, but the discussions revealed a great deal about attitudes within the American government.

There may also a mistaken view among policy makers that Afghans do not have the capacity or the will to rise to high standards. A possible fallacy is confounding a low literacy rate with a limited ability to learn.

Everyone who has taught students in Afghanistan will testify that they are extraordinarily dedicated to learning. There is a great hunger for education in Afghanistan. This is true from village girls seeking basic instruction to university students wishing to acquire knowledge needed to compete in a flat world.

In 1973, our U.S. consortium of engineering schools left Afghanistan with an indigenous school having 500 male and female students in the various fields of engineering, as well as Architecture, conducted by a faculty of 35 Afghans who taught in English
at international standards. Many on the faculty held Master's and Doctoral Degrees obtained at leading American Universities including Purdue, Georgia Tech and Stevens. These Afghans had received attractive job offers in the United States, but chose to return to Afghanistan to work in difficult conditions for twenty-five dollars a month. They were highly dedicated to advancing their country. It should also be noted that the students enrolled at the College of Engineering were from every part of the country. They gained admissions through a scrupulously fair entrance examination process that was administered by the Afghan Dean and his associates. Women students from the provinces were accommodated at a woman's dormitory on campus. Kabul University was a national institution that served the entire nation, just as the military at that time was a national army with recruits from all corners of the country. These institutions belie the often heard
assertions that Afghanistan was never a country. A cursory examination of Afghan history shows otherwise.

The top ten percent of the graduates were able to go on to graduate schools in any country of the world without any remediation or special conditions. The graduates served in important positions in government and in the private sector. When the Red Arm marched into Kabul in 1979, one of the first actions of the Soviets was to close this College of Engineering.

However, the dedication of the faculty was so great that they initiated a Faculty of Engineering in Exile in Peshawar for young people living in the refugee camps. I visited the program on behalf of USAID in 1988. The first three years of a five year curriculum were being offered. When I asked the Afghan Dean of the Program about their ability to maintain standards,he told me that they had changed the passing grade that had been used in Kabul of 50 percent to 60 percent. I was astonished and asked why they would increase the passing grade for the school in exile. His response was, "We are refugees and we must work harder." That is an Afghan attitude. The United States should not ask for anything less.

It has become commonplace for otherwise thoughtful people to
say, "How can the United States win in Afghanistan, if the Soviet Union failed?"

Another simplistic notion, that is widely accepted, is that the United States loss in Vietnam
should inform us of an impending defeat in Afghanistan.

There are two fallacious assumptions that negate these shibboleths.

One is that the Taliban are freedom fighters. They are not. The Taliban were
created in 1994 by the ISI of Pakistan and have taken on mercenary members
in Afghanistan, but their core values, dedicated recruits and center of power reside in
Pakistan. In contrast, Ho Chi Minh fought all his life against colonialism. The French were oppressive colonialists
in Vietnam for about 100 years prior to the United States taking on their mantle. The United States was on the
wrong side of a war of freedom fighters seeking independence.

In Afghanistan, the Red Army marched into the country in 1979 as out-and-out invaders seeking to annex Afghanistan to
the Soviet Union. The Mujihhadin were dedicated freedom fighters.

It is the Taliban, that is seen by the Afghan people as a foreign force. The United States is not there to occupy the country
but to liberate it. Most, but not all, Afghans appreciate this reality.

The second fallacious assumption is that the war that one sees is in fact the real war. This was not true in Vietnam. The
real war was a combination of a anti-colonial struggle being fought with vast outside support. In the case of Vietnam the support
for the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese Army came from the Soviet Union and from China. In Afghanistan, the real war was that of the Soviet Union fighting dedicated freedom fighters who had vast support of materials,
training and funding from the United States with additional funding from Saudia Arabia.

The case is made in Post #7, that the Taliban must also be highly dependent upon outside support, This comes not only in terms
of leadership, training and direction from the ISI of Pakistan, but also from supporters of militant jihadism in the Islamic world.

The United States can prevail against the Taliban by capitalizing on their status as an unwanted presence and by seeking to eliminate
their support from outside the boundaries of Afghanistan. While these are challenging tasks, it is first necessary to recognize
the reality of the situation. The American public needs to be better informed about the context in which this struggle is taking place.

It is surprising that with all the reporting, editorializing, think tank reports, Congressional Hearings, talk show interviews and debates, etc. there is little discussion of who funds the Taliban. It is a fundamental and profound aspect of the current conflicts in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. One clear source comes from drugs. But is that enough? In trying to aswer that question it is useful to make a couple of comparisons - (1) with the level of funding received by the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong in their struggle with the United States and (2) the level of funding received by the Mujahaddin in their struggles with the Soviet Union.

(1) In the book, "Soviet Union and Revolutionary Warfare: Principles, Practices, and Regional Comparisons," by Richard H. Shultz Jr that was published by Hoover Institution Press in 1988, the following statistics are found:

" Economic Assistance from the Soviet Bloc and China grew from $100 million in 1964 to $275 million in 1966.

Military aid was $270 million in 1965, but increased to approximately $455 million one year later.

During the 1965-1973 period, the Soviet Union provided the Democratic Republic of Vietnam - Viet Cong (DRVN_VC) approximately $4 billion in various kinds of military equipment for approximately 70 percent of North Vietnam's external arms support. For the same period, China furnished between $1 and $2 billion."

Shultz goes on to say that North Vietnam obtained more than four times the amount in aid than they lost in the heavy bombing of the North by the United States and emerged as a stronger country.

Given that a dollar from 1970 has a purchasing power today that is more than five times greater, we see that the outside support for the war, that was received by North Vietnam and the Viet Cong, was about $6 billion over an 8 year period that would have a value of around $32 billion today or approximately $4 billion per year.

(2) Turning to outside support for the Mujahaddin in their struggle with the Soviet Union, we find that Steven Coll in his book, "Ghost Wars," estimates that CIA support was about $500 million per year at the height of the conflict. It is also reliably reported that Saudi Arabia effectively matched the U.S. support. Hence the Mujahaddin received at least a billion dollars per year in 1985 dollars. That level of funding translates into $2 billion per year today. While these are approximate numbers it is reasonable to assume that the Taliban in Afghanistan are funded with about one billion dollars per year from drug money but need at least another billion per year to support their efforts. There is widespread speculation that much of this comes from Wahabi sources in Saudi Arabia and Gulf States. In an article published November 28, 2009, in ExpressBuzz from India, Aditya Sinha, accuses Saudi Arabia of being a major funder of jihadism in the region. Sinha, asserts that Saudi Arabia implements this funding through the ISI of Pakistan. Sinha states that the Saudis are, "...directly responsible for the ISI's growth, nurturing and evolution."

A link to that article appears below:

http://www.expressbuzz.com/edition/story.aspx?Title=The+sponge+of+terror&arti...

It is difficult to analyze this issue, but it is clearly one that has been neglected in discussions of public policy regarding the U.S. efforts to deal with jihadist forces in Afghanistan
and Pakistan. A strategy aimed at significantly reducing Taliban funding could have great impact and perhaps be achieved in a shorter time period than many other initiatives that are being discussed.

Other implications of this analysis are presented in a separate discussion in Post #8.

Ahmed Rashid is one the most knowledgeable commentators
on Afghan-Pakistan issues. He has written three important books
about the Taliban, Jihadism and the crisis in the region of Afghanistan-
Pakistan and Central Asia. He was also a key member of Richard Holbrooke's
Task Force on Afghan-Pak Policy at Asia Society. The Task Force issued
its report in Februrary 2009. I believe that it has helped shape policy of the
Obama administration.

A link to The National Interest Article is at:

http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=22352

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/31/opinion/l31afghan.html?scp=1&sq=Edward%...

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/04/opinion/l04afghan.html?scp=3&sq=Edward%...